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TALKING POI NTS : ARIZONA AND AFRICA 
**Over the last half century, US transnational mining 
corporations have been shifting mining production from Arizona to 
lower wage areas like that of southern Africa. Often in 
collaboration with the South African mining finance house, the 
Anglo American Group, US firms have thus put the wages and 
working conditions, won by U. S. miners over generations of 
struggle, in competition with those imposed under apartheid. 
Since World War II, starting in southern Africa, US 
agribusinesses and transnational manufacturing firms, too --
seeking to maximize their global profits -- have sought to 
pentrate the Afr ican continent in search of markets, cheaper 
s ources of raw mater ials, and low cost labor. <For history, see 
pp.2-4, 12-14; for South African links, see pp.fff and Notes on 
the Structural Issues Relevant to all the Southwestern States, 
attached at back > 
**Since 1980, increased US milit ary intervention seems designed 
to further open up the entire African continent to US corporate 
penetration -- much as, in the early part of this century, the 
marines assisted US businesses to expand in Latin America.<See 
pp. 5> 
**The military buildup in the US has had both direct and hidden 
costs for Arizona, aggravating it s dichotomized development <see 
pp. l2ff >. 
**The pattern of d evelopment has led to growing number s of 
unemployed, declining union membership, falling r eal incomes and 
the impoverishment of growing number s of the state's population, 
especially women, Mexican Americans, Native Americans, blacks and 
the elderly <see pp. 13- 14, 17-18> 
*Alternative patterns of development could lead to full 
employment and rising living standards both in Africa and Arizona 
<See pp . 18 and Notes on Structural issues ..... > 
MILITARIZATION IN AFRICA AND THE US SOUTHWEST 
I NTRODUCT I 01\1: 
The growing US militarization of Afri ca 
affects the economic situation confronting the 
populati ons of the s outhwest United States in two 
respects: First, given the technological revolution 
that has shrunken the world ' s parameters, US military 
support for conservative governments seeks to open up 
--------------------------~t~h~e=-~r~i~c~h~ffi~1··~p·e~J·~-a~l~a~n~d~a~g~r~i~c~L~l~l7t~L~lr-;a~l~r~e~s~o~L~l~r~c~e~s~~a~n~d~~vua~s~t~----l ow paid 1 abor J~eserves of the African continent ------__ 
(three times the size of the United States with a 
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population of over 500 illion) to US transnationals, 
putting the wages and working conditions of the US 
Southwest in competition with those of the oppressed 
workers of places like apartheid South Africa; and, 
second, the increased militarization of the US itself? 
including the Southwest, while enriching a few very 
large transnational corporations and counties, imposes 
both direct and hidden costs that undermine the living 
standards of the majority of people of the region. 
I. ARIZONA'S BACKGROUND: To understand how US militarization in 
Africa aggravates unemployment and poverty Arizona, it helps, 
first, to outline the historical circumstances that shaped the 
current dichotomous development of resources in the US southwest~ 
A. New Mexico (including Arizona), the focus of the Spanish 
colonizers' North American conquest, has in the last century 
become a relatively less important hinterland of modern Texas 
Ctoday the regional subcenter of the southwest): 
1. The Spanish colonialists by-passed Texas to pursue the 
(contradictory) aims of converting to Catholicism the relatively 
populous sedentary peoples (especially the Pueblos) who had long 
before established a self-sufficient agricultural and handicraft 
economy and mined the rich mineral deposits stored in the 
mountains; and forcing them to provide mineral riches to their 
Spanish overlords. 
2. In the mid 19th Century, expanding westwards to fulfill a 
self-proclaimed 'manifest destiny,· the United States came into 
conflict with and defeated the army of . the newly independent 
Mexican government, taking over New Mexico and what later became 
Arizona~ along with California? Nevada, utah and part s of 
Colorado and Wyoming -- essentially a third of what had been 
Mexico's territory. 
3. For almost three fourths of a century, until shortly 
before World War I, New Mexico and Arizona remained without 
statehood, reflecting US suspicions aroused by conflicts between 
the Native American peoples, the Mexican Americans, and 'Anglos' 
trekking in, mainly from Texas and the US South, primarily in 
search of mineral wealth. 
a. US army policies of coercing Native Americans into 
reserves Can idea later adopted by South Africans in setting 
up reserves that became the 'bantustans') reflected racist 
perspectives; eg. Commander of the California Column 
Carleton, who assumed control of the Department of New Mexico 
in the 1860s, supported placing Native Americans on 
reservations which 
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"~Jill be Islands; and as time elap~ses ,::\nd the race 
dies out, these Islands may become less and less, until 
finally, the great sea <of white men> will engulf them 
one after another until they become known only in 
history and at length are blotted out, of even that, 
for-ever." CF.D RE":~eve, "The Long Walk," New t'le:-:ico 
Historical RevievJ, Vol. XIII, no.. 1 (Jan 19:39 
, pp. 14- 35; republished in R. N. 
Ellis, ed. New Mexico Past and Present - a historical reader 
<Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1971 } .]) 
b. After the Civil War-, the "Santa Fe Ring," consisting 
largely of Republican "Anglos" with ties to lrJashington, 
dominated New Mexico's economy, engaging in railroads, 
ranching, mining, and above all land grants with 'rubber like 
qualities' as they stretched far beyond their original 
boundaries. 
4. The coming of the railroads, centered largely in Texas 
reduced the importance of the Santa Fe trail westwards, on the 
one hand ensuring the larger state of Texas, with its growing oil 
wealth and access to the sea, the dominant place in the region; 
and, on the other, contributing to the separation of Arizona as a 
state apart from New Mexico. 
a. In 1853- 4, the Gadsden Purchase extended what later 
became southern Arizona further into Mexico to acquire an easy 
rail route from the Rio Grande to the Pacific Coast. 
Exploring back eastward from California, mine companies 
discoverd Arizona's rich minerals. 
b. Native Americans, who had originally aided US troops to 
defeat the mexicans, came into conflict with the expanding 
Anglo Americans' frontier posts. After the Civil War, US 
based Anglo mining interests demanded and finally won 
administrative separation of the Arizona territory from New 
Mexico, which they claimed neglected the lands to the west. 
The US army buit more military posts, requring supplies that 
stimulated local cultivation of farm products and live stock 
ranching. 
5. Nineteenth century development in Arizona centered around 
minerals exported as raw materials to eastern factories, 
protected by the military, and financed by eastern capitaln 
a. More Anglos flocked into the territory, both to mine and 
to farm. With superior numbers, firepower and resources, the 
army gradually pushed the Native Americans on to reservations. 
After the final defeat of Geronimo in 1886, racism spurred the 
army to exile the Apaches (including non-belligerants, despite 
-=!' 
·-· 
the vigorus protests and resignation of Genera George Crook 
who pointed out some had assisted the US forces) to distant 
Florida. There many succumed to tuberculosis before the US 
army again moved them first to Alabama and later to Fort Sill, 
Oklahoma. 
b. Financed by eastern US capital, the railroads replaced 
perviously prosperous Mexican-American freighting companies. 
Irrigated land schemes bringing Anglo homesteaders cut off 
water supplies from downstream Mexican-American farms, pushing 
many of their former owners into wage labor. [For the way 
class and race entered into the Mexicans' loss of their 
predominant status, see, eg., T. E. Sheridan, - The Mexican 
Community in Tucson, 1854- 1941 <Tuscan: the University of 
Arizona Press , 1986>; and more generally David Mantajano, 
Mexicans vs. Anglo Americans, 1846-1986 <Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1987)]. Ranching companies~ using barbed wire and 
low- cost windmills, revolutionized the cattle industry across 
the territory. 
c. The new silver and copper mines, digging deep into 
underground lodes throughout south and western Arizona, 
required relatively large amounts of capital, increasingly 
provided by New York's Wall Street, and labor: 
i. After the late 1880s, as electricity provided a 
growing market for copper wire, copper became Arizona's 
leading mineral. Mexican-Americans, together with 
Mexicans coming from across the border and immigrants from 
places as far away as Cornwall and the Balkans, provided 
the low paid mining force that helped make the burgeoning 
mining business profitable. Many of these gave leadership 
to the coalition of mineworkers, small farmers, and some 
local businesses in the Populist movement that swept 
across the South and midwest opposition to the domination 
by the railroad and mining companies. 
ii. Just before World War I, to thwart the workers' 
efforts to unionize, "Rawhide" Jimmy Douglas, head of the 
leading Arizona copper company, Phelps Dodge, banished 
hundreds of strikers from company towns and encouraged 
armed men to load hundreds of stikers aboard freight 
trains for deportation to New Mexico. 
iii. By the post World War II era, Arizona mines, some 
owned by companies which also acquired South African 
assets (in 1984, these included Phelps Dodge, Newmont, and 
others -- see Notes on Issues Relevant to the Structure of 
all Southwestern States, attached) produced about two 
thirds of the copper mined in the US, about a third of the 
world's supply. They also produced molybdenum, used to 
harden steel and aluminum . . 
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II. THE CASE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA illustrates the reasons for and 
the impact of US militarization in Africa, its implications 
for the future development in the US southwest: 
A. The post World War II technological revolution 
facilitated the growth of US transnational corporate investment 
in Africa, first to gain access to rich mineral and agricultural 
resources, using the cheap labor reserves (even lower than those 
of Latin America because of the disruption caused by centuries of 
the slave trade, followed by a hundred years of outright colonial 
rule>; and then to build manufacturing industries, especially in 
South Africa where apartheid ensured continued low cost labor 
along with access to southern African raw materials, markets for 
manufactured goods, and high rates of profit. 
<This background is detailed in Seidman, The Roots of Crisis 
in Southern Africa <Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1985> and 
Seidman, Apartheid and the U.S. Southeast, forthcoming, esp. 
Chs. 3 and 4) 
1. US mining and financial interests have long invested in 
southern African minerals, gradually shifting to sources there 
while reducing mining output and laying off US miners: 
a. South Africa's leading mining finance house, the 
Anglo American Group, began operations at the outset of World 
War I with the help of Morgan financial interests; and has 
s ince expanded its ties in the US through a growing network of 
corporate interests, including Engelhard (which provided it 
with Democratic Party links>; Newmont Mining <which today owns 
Peabody, a leading US coal mining company, in partnership with 
Bechtel, which contributed Shultz and Weinburger to Reagan's 
Cabinet); and American Metal Climax CAMAX> (see list of 
Anglo-American international affiliations in Innes, Anglo 
America and the Rise of Modern South Africa). In the 1970s, 
the Anglo American Group, operating through its offshore 
Bermuda base, MINORCO, became the second largest foreign 
investor in the United States, with controlling investments in 
a wide range of activities, beginning in mines and extending 
into finance, including the leading Wall Street firm, Phibro 
Salomon, with links to the Rockefeller Citicorp. 
b. Starting after the first World War and continuing 
through the apartheid era into the present, in collaboration 
with US and British firms, the Anglo Group developed mines 
throughout South and southern Africa, including copper in 
Zambia, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Zaire (where it also 
worked with Belgian interests>; diamonds in Botswana, Namibia, 
Angola, and Tanzania; iron ore in Swaziland and, in 
cooperation with the then-Rhodesian government, Zimbabwe; 
platinum and gold in South Africa; and uranium in South Africa 
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and Namibia (in cooperation with Rio Tinto Zinc). Union 
Carbide developed chrome and ferro chrome mines in Zimbabwe 
and South Africa. As the US companies shifted to southern and 
particularly South Africa for their sources of these minerals, 
they strengthened the basis of the argument that these 
provided " strate~)i c" i ntel~ests ~<-Jhi ch US policy must protect .. 
<See appendix to this outline for U.S. companies with 
investments in South Africa and details relating to their role 
in the U.S. southwest) 
i. Companies like AMAX and Newmont could close down the 
southwestern mines and import copper and other strategic 
minerals, including lead, platinum and vanadium (see 
Appendix I in Roots of Crisis) from their southern African 
mines where they paid workers a fraction of what they paid 
unionized US mine workers. 
i i. In the 1 ate 1970s and '80s, wor 1 d copper prices 
plummeted. The independent African copper producers 
Zambia, Zaire and Zimbabwe - - having adopted western advice 
to expand copper instead of redirecting their copper 
profits to more balanced integrated economic development, 
experienced growing foreign debts . The IMF imposed 
conditions forcing them to devalue their currencies, 
further lowering their workers' real wages to cut their 
copper prices, in a desparate effort to expand their copper 
sales. 
In this period, employment in the Southwest's copper 
industry declined, and the US. firms, spearheaded by Phelps 
Dodge (with holdings in South Africa) in the southwst <and 
by Shell,BP and Fluor in Appalachia- see Apartheid and the 
US Southeast, op. cit.), mounted a major attack on the US 
mineworkers' unions. 
iii . When Rio Tinto Zinc began to sell Namibian uranium, 
mined under conditions of apartheid (with little or no 
protection against the effects of radiation) by workers 
receiving wages less than a fourth those of US miners (in 
violation of UN embargo against investments in Namibia 
until South Africa granted it independence) US mine firms 
stopped mining uranium in New Mexico and laid off thousands 
of worke1~~5. 
2. The role of the US "majors" in African oil: 
a. As African states won political independence and improved 
communications and shipping facilities reduced the costs of 
long-distance production in the post World War II era, US oil 
"majors" e:-:panded their e:-:plol~ation and e:-:ploitation of 
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African crude oil in Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, and Angola, 
shipping it to their refineries at home or elsewhere for sale 
throughout the world's markets. 
i. Initially, the US oil companies shipped away the 
African states' low cost crude, paying little in taxes, and 
remitting most of their profits without regard for national 
development. With the advent of OPEC, the participating 
African states forced up world oil prices and captured a 
larger share of the resulting investable surpluses, but, 
through their control of the major refineries and marketing 
networks, the companies reaped even higher profits 
attaining the status of the world's largest companies with 
incomes exceeding that of several independent African 
countries. 
11. Some African countries sought to reinvest their oil 
profits in their national development, achieving some 
success in restructuring their economies to meet their 
peoples' needs. 
iii. The non-oil producing countries, their modern 
export-orientedebckaves dependent on oil for fuel and 
lubrication, had to spend up to a third of their export 
earnings to buy oil, regardless of the price-- a 
significant factor in their mounting external debt. 
iv. In southern Africa, Angola, upon attain liberation 
from the Portuguese in 1976, negotiated an agreement with 
Gulf Oil <now Chevron) to acquire shares in Gulf's Angolan 
affiliate, and half the profits. In return for its shares , 
Gulf would train local people, provide the necessary 
technology, and refine and sell the oil through its 
international marketing network. 
a) Through Gulf, the US remained Angola's leading 
trading partner. 
b) A member of the nine-state association of 
independent southern African countries <the Southern 
African Development Coordination Conference, SADCC) 
that sought to cooperate to attain development and 
reduce dependence on South Africa, Angola agreed, once 
it established its own refinery capacity and developed 
the essential infrastructure, to provide lower-cost oil 
product s to its fellow SADCC members 
b. The 'majors' made their biggest oil refinery investments 
on the entire African continent, not in the independent 
states, but in South Africa. There they made a key 
contribution to building up the racist minority's 
military-industrial capacity to oppress the African majority 
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at home and destabilize the entire southern African region. 
i. Ironically, South Africa has no oil deposits of its 
own; but it depends em the oi 1 'majors' --- Cal t<:";!H ( Standar··d 
Oil of California and Texaco), Mobil, and Shell-BP - -to bring 
in oil for their refineries. This they did, under a heavy 
curtain of government secrecy, despite the OPEC and UN 
attempt s to impose an effective boycott. <Mobil earlier 
helped to evade the UN boycott against the then-Rhodesian 
government which had unilaterally declared independence (UDI> 
to prevent establishment of majority rule in what, after 15 
year s of guerilla war, became Zimbabwe.) 
ii. Shell - BP collaborated with the South African 
government-owned Sentrachem to build a petrochemicals 
industry, essential for inputs to industry and its 
growing military buildup. 
iii. The US engineering firm, Fluor, constructed a giant 
oil - from-coal facility for the minority government ' s 
SABOL, designed to reduce its dependence on imported oil 
(its capacity remains secret, but estimates range from 
10% to 30% of South Africa ' s oil needs. 
(For details re Fluor and Shell - BP's anti - union 
activities in South Africa and the US Southeast, see 
Apartheid and the US Southeast, Ch. 6) 
3. Manufacturing~ 
a. All the independent African states sought to attract 
investment in industries to increase productive employment 
opportunities and raise living standards; but three fourths 
of all U.S. manufacturing investment on the entire continent 
went into the military- industrial manufacturing business of 
apartheid South Africa. 
i. Essentially, US firms began to eHtend the maquiladora 
concept to South Africa where, until the 1980s, the regime 
pursued policies that ensured them rates of profit 
averaging 25 percent. 
11. Increasingly, as anti - apartheid divestment pressures 
mounted, US firms shed their ownership of local plants and 
c:ontr-·acted with 1 ocall y-based firms <which they 11 sold 11 to 
the local managers or to the Anglo American Group) to sell 
them the machinery, equipment and materials, if necessary 
helping to f inance it. 
b. US. firms sought thus to take advantage of: 
<For details re firms and their role in southern Africa, see 
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Apartheid and the US Southeast, Ch. 4; after identifying 
particular transnational corporate affiliate in the southwest, 
look at the 1984 list of US firms with assets and employees in 
South Africa <See Appendix in Roots of Crisis, op. cit.>, to 
see if also operated in them.) 
i. Cheap labor di s ciplined under apartheid conditions for 
labor intensive manufacturing processes like 
*those of auto firms like GM, Ford and Chrysler <the 
latter two sold out to the Anglo American Group>; 
*textiles <In the 1980s, for example, Sears Roebuck 
could buy textiles from Taiwanese firms hiring workers 
in the bantustans for $7 a week, compared eg t o North 
Carolina workers -- the lowest paid in the US -- who 
received $7 an hour; whil e North Carolina lost 43 
te:·:tile jobs a day, Sears could sell "Tc.'l.iwanese-made" 
goods despite the unenforced US sanctions.>; 
*high-tech: eg. IBM sold its South African plant, but 
continues to sell computer technology to the South 
African firm under contract, and claims no 
responsibility when that firm sells it to the 
government <which, under 1986 sanctions law, would be 
illegal for IBM to do). 
ii. Access to South and southern African crude 
materials, produced by low paid labor in mines and on 
corporate and settler farms throughout the region and 
shipped in v i a trading networks dominated by the Anglo 
American Group. iii. Access to markets, including: 
*The wealthy white 20% of the South African population 
who could afford luxury durable goods; 
*Advanced electrical, automotive, and e v e n 
nuclear - related technologies for the regime's 
military, expanding as it sought to perpetuate its 
oppressive rule at home and destabilize the region 
<sales through local South African-owned firms enabled 
the US manufacturer s to evade the letter of the US 
sanctions law>; GE, General Motors, Westinghouse, IT&T 
contributed these kinds of goods; 
*Improved technologies to enable the minority to 
develop industry, mining, agriculture and the military 
while reducing "dependence" on black labor -- a major 
factor contributing to growing unemployment in South 
Africa; firms like IBM, Burroughs, Honeywell helped 
make white South Africa one of the most if not the 
most - - highly computerized populations in the world; 
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mean while black unemployment scared to an estimated 
30 to 40 percent of the populations as almost half the 
black population struggles forsurvival without paid 
jobs in the destitute bantustans. 
*The neighboring countries, whose externally oriented 
economies remain dependent on imported machinery, 
equipment an d luxuries for the elites, now produced in 
South Africa -- as South Africa exerts is economic, 
political and military power to coerce them to buy 
fl~om it.. 
4. U.S. banks have contributed loans and trading finance to 
South African firms, enabling them to continue to finance the 
import of technology and the export of their products: 
a. Although the 1986 sanctions prohibits further loans, the 
banks have engaged in rolling over past loans through 
rescheduling them, thus continuing to make funds available. 
b. Among the leading transnational corporate bank s with loans 
outstanding to South Africa, Citicorp of New York has close 
ties with the Anglo American Group; and in 1987 turned over 
its South African assets to that Group, presumably continuing 
to conduct its business through Anglo American channels 
<including MINORCO based in Bermuda, with which Citicorp h as 
long had ties; Walter Wriston, former head of Citicorp, sat on 
the MINORCO board.) 
i. Citicorp, which accumulates investable surpluses from 
clients doing business in the US (like mining 
companies) makes over half its profits from by making 
loans overseas 
c. Data is needed on the way banks accumulate funds from US 
business and reinvest them to build up r egional subcenters 
like South Africa. 
B. Increasingly backed by military intervention, the Reagan 
Administration's Constructive Engagement Policy in southern 
Afl~ica aimed to sustai n the conditions in which US "interests" 
could thus exp and: 
1. It incorporates a two-str-·anded pol icy: (for details, see 
Seidman, Roots of Crisis in Southern Africa, especially chs. 5 
.:md 6.): 
a. lt seeks to encourage the South African regime to 
compromise with its domestic opponents to implement 'reforms ' 
to eliminate the most blatent raci s t features while 
maintaining the profitable economic status quo; 
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b. It aims to slow down change in the neighboring countries 
to give the South African regime time to achieve this goal, 
while retaining its dominant position throughout the region. 
2. In implementing this policy, the Reagan administration (for 
details, see Apartheid and the US Southeast, Ch. 4): 
a. Refuses to effectively implement even the 1986 
Congressional compromise sanctions against South Africa 
passed over the President's veto-- or even the UN embargo on 
military-related equipment (signed by the US>; thus US firms 
may, under the flimsiest pretexts, assist South Africa to 
evade those national and international laws; 
b. Thwarts negotiat ion s for Namibian independence by 
insisting on linking them with the withdrawal of Cuban troops 
from Angola; 
c. Provides open support for the South African suppor t ed 
anti-government contra force, UNITA, in Angola, some of it 
through South Africa in violation of the UN embargo; 
d. Built up a military airforce base in Zaire as a second 
channel of aid for UNITA; 
e. Provides military assistance for the Ki ngdom of Morocco, 
(much of which it uses in its war against the Saharan Peoples 
Republic>, while Moroc c o provides headquarters for UNITA. 
2. The South Afri can-US supported UNITA focusses on targets that 
aim to disrupt Angola's development and the landlocked 
independent southern African states' efforts to reduce their 
hi storically-shaped dependence on South Africa: 
a. Seeking to delitimize and destabilize the Angolan 
government, UNITA attacks peasant food production and 
development projects, 
b . To thwart the efforts of Angola's SADCC neighbors to u se 
them to import and export goods outside of South Africa, 
UNITA destroys Angolan transport networks, especially the 
Benguela Railroad, 
C. Insofar as this "maquiladorization" of southel·-n Africa 
reflects the role of US transnational corporations in shifting 
productive activities from the US to that region to exploit the 
low living standards imposed by the dominant South African 
regime, it has direct implications for development in the US 
southwest . 
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1. It tends to undermine US wages and working 
conditions, contributing to rising unemployment in the higher 
paid productive sectors, with a shift to employment opportunities 
in the lower paid services and trade sectors, leading to 
declining real incomes for the lower income sectors of the 
population. 
2. This trend will likely become more evident as devaluation 
of the US currency reduces the purchasing power of the 
wages US workers earn. 
III. ARIZONA TODAY: The way U.S. transnational corporations, 
now backed by increased US militarization, 
have taken advantage of the post-World War II revolution in 
technology to shift productive sectors to low wage areas like 
southern Africa has had significant consequences for the people of 
Arizona: 
A. By the 1980s, Arizona <1980 population=3,053,000, roughly 
one fifth Hispanic, 1.7% black) was characterized by dualistic 
development, with a sharply skewed income distribution related to 
military-high tech development for a small percentage of the 
population; and low incomes and high poverty rates for growing 
numbers, especially among the Hispanic and Native American 
population:l 
1. The structure of employment changed dramatically over the 
last half century: 
a. As large scale irrigated farms squeezed out small 
farmers, the farm population dropped to 1.42% of total 
Arizona residents in 1970, and even further to 0.51% in 1980. 
b. Mining employment, with about two thirds of the mine 
workers in metal mining,priarily copper, also declined from 
about 16,600 in 1982 to 12,300 in 1985 -- barely 1% of the 
state's total wage employment. In 1985, mine wages averaged 
$25,701, somewhat above New Mexico's ($24,249) and the 
national average ($23,661). 
i. US firms like Phelps Dodge, Newmont and Amax 
could obtain minerals far more cheaply mined by third 
world workers in places like South Africa or Namibia for 
wages a fourth as high. 
1. Unless otherwise cited, the following data 
Department of Commerce, State and Metropolitan 
<Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986. 
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is from the 
Data Book 
c. In 1985, manufacturing employed 172,000 workers, about 
16 percent of the state's wage labor force, more than a third 
higher than in 1977 (in contrast to a decline of -2.5%, 
nationally.) 
i. Most of this growth took place in urban a reas, 
aggravating the dichotomy between urban prosperity and 
rur·al poverty. 
i. High tech industries electric and electronic 
equipment, machinery except electrical, and transportation 
equipment -- employed about two thirds of Arizona's 
manufacturing workers. 
a) How IBM used contractual relations to lower its 
labor costs in Arizona, see Notes on Issues Relevant •.• 
attached) 
11. In 1982, Arizona's manufacturing wages averaged 
$16,418, about the same as the national average, and 
somewhat above New Mexico's, though somewhat below Texas' 
and Colol~ado's. 
a) The Arizona average was raised by relatively high 
wages paid in the electric and electronic equipment 
Cover $24,000), wh ereas food, textiles and other 
industries paid wages roughly half that. 
i) Wives of laid off mine workers in Tuscan took 
jobs in these industries in order to continue 
payments on s uch necessities as health insurance 
and houses. 
b) By 1987, growing numbers of manufac turing firms had 
moved their productive work across the border to Mexico 
i) The Arizona Daily Star of Tuscan listed 
(3/6/88) foreign-owned maquiladora assembly plants 
with 100 or more workers in Nogales, Sonora, across 
the border from Ariz on a. In 1984· , several had 
assets in South Africa, including (number of 
maquiladora plant employees in parentheses): 
General El ect 1~i c (518); ITT (294); and Xerm: (294>. 
d. The non -productive sectors, also primarily centered in the 
urban areas? employed over 80 percent of the privately 
employed labor force, but some paid considerably lower wages. 
In the retail trade? with 242,000 employees, for example, 
annual salary averaged about $10,000. 
As unemployment mounted in Arizona, U.S. fir ms demanded that 
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workers make wage concessions and give up 'fri nge' benefits in 
return for continue d employment; and conducted intensified 
anti-union activities. 
a. In 1983, for example, Phelps Dodge -- which has South 
African assets - - brought in scabs and broke the at its 
Bisbee mines, imposi ng a 20-30% wage cut and leading the 
campaign to break unions throughout the region; 
b. Magma mine, 20% owned by the Anglo American affiliate, 
Newmont, forced the workers to accept a similar wage cut or 
lose their jobs <See Notes on Issues Relevant ...• attached) 
c. From 1975 to 1982, union membership in Arizona dropped 
from 151,600 to 131,700, that is, from 20.9% to 12.8% of the 
labor force. 
3. Dichotomized development left large numbers of Arizona's rural 
population <especially former miners, farmers, Mexican Americans 
and Native Americans, totalling about 25% of the population) with 
less employment and lower incomes than those living in the 
cities. 
a. With a per capita income of $9,005 in 1983, ($600 less in 
real terms than in 1979), Arizona ranked below the average 
for the United States ($9,496 in 1983). 
b. A higher proportion of Arizonans (13.2%) received 
less-than- poverty line incomes than for the US as a whole 
(12.4%>; 
c. Those receiving below poverty line incomes constitute a 
much higher proportion of Arizonans living in rural areas 
(19.3%), where Hi spanics make up 19.22% of the population and 
which include the Native American reservations. 
d. Tuscan, where Hispanic s make up 25 percent of the 
population, has the highest urban poverty rate, about 15%. 
d. In 1984, urban unemployment in Arizona(3.9%) was below 
the national rate (7.5), but in rural areas it was higher 
(9.4% compared to 9.1%). 
B. The US domestic military buildup, necessary to sustain 
the kind of military intervention designed to 'open up' Africa, 
had both direct and hidden costs for Arizona: 
1. The military had long been a major feature of Arizona's 
landscape, part of the US westward thrust: 
a. Fort Huachuca was headquarters for the famed Geronimo 
Campaign and remained to guard the border and deal with Native 
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American 'holdouts.· Today, it the home of world - wide Army 
Intelligence. 
b. The military uses five percent of Arizona's land area, a 
sixth of all the land the military uses throughout the US. 
Large areas are designated 11 high risk target 11 areas in case o·f 
nuclear war. 
c. Thousands of Gis trained in Arizona during World War II; 
and returned after the war, fueling a population boom in the 
1960s and 60s. With air conditioning, manufacturers and 
services businesses, attracted by climate, a relatively 
unorganized labor force, and, in the 1970s, low energy costs, 
came into the state. Two thirds of the 1980 population come 
from out of state, especially in Phoenix and Tuscon. 
d. The military provides about 15% of Arizona's income -- but 
it goes to a limited number of Arizona counties and companies. 
e. Arizona receives over $8 billion for military related 
research; some university departments depend on the military 
for 50% of their research budgets. 
2. The military spending in the region tend to be concentrated 
among a few firms and in a few military installations~ thus 
aggravating the lop - sided pattern of state development which 
enriches a few and impoverishes growing numbers of state 
citizens~2 
a. Arizona contributes a sixth of all the land the 
military uses in the US: 
i. It hosts several bases: 
*Davis-Monthan Air Force Base - Home of the tactical 
Air Control Wing that provides air strikes in 
support of ground forces world wide; trains 
personnel for the Ground Launched Cruise Missile 
(subject to INF treaty>; and stores used US aircraft 
for future sale to foreign governments. 
* Williams Air Force Base, ouside of Mesa, to train 
undergraduate pilots. 
2. Unless otherwise cited, the following information is from Nina 
Moh i t, Balancing the Books - military Spending in Arizona , the 
Impact & alternatives <Phoenix: The Arizona Center to Revers the 
Arms Race, 1210 East virginia Street, Phoenix, Arizona, 85006. 
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*Luke Air Force Base to which allied countries send 
pilot trainees for instruction in nuclear-capable 
Fl6 conversion instruction. 
*Fort Huachuca, Arizona's only army base, is the 
"Home of Army Intelligence," the headquaters fo1~ the 
U.S. Army Communications Command worldwide which 
trains all the Army's intelligence personnel. It 
has 9000 square miles of private and public land 
with facilities for testing electronic warfare 
equiipment and disposing of military chemicals and 
E~l·:pl osi ves. 
*Yuma Proving Grounds and the Marine Corp Air 
Station provides advanced training including nuclear 
weapons delivery instruction in a 1400 square mile 
area. Nuclear artillery and neutron warheads are 
test-fired hel~e. 
11. Other military installations include the Naval Space 
Surveillance System transmitter at Gila River; the 
Holbrook Radar Bomb Scoring Site for nuclear bomb 
delivery practice of the Air Force's Strategic air 
command; and the Joint Surveillance Radar System at Cave 
C1··eek. 
111. Much air space is occupied by Department training, 
texting and transport. Unmakred railroad convoys carry 
nuclear warhead cargoes for the military division of the 
Department of Energy's factories and storage depots 
scattered throughout the country. 
b. Aside from the military personnel living there~ who 
come from all over the nation, the bases primarily provide 
relatively low paid service jobs for Arizona citizens living 
in the immediate neighborhood. 
c. Hidden costs of these military installations include: 
i. the loss of tax dollars, since the vast acreages of 
land are exempt from most or all tax payments; 
11. environmental degradation, as weapons use and 
production often impact negatively on the surrounding 
neighborhood; in Arizona, these dangers include 
pollution of both land and air since testing affects the 
air, and disposal of wastes may leak into surrounding 
soils and water supplies. Efforts are being made to 
investigate these issues in southern Arizona, but 
without much government assistance <Talk with Dick 
Kemp, Border Ecology Center on Toxic Waste, P.O. Box 5, 
NACO, Arizona 85620; Phone: 602-432- 7456). 
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iii. tax expenditures for schools, roads, additional 
heal th facilities and police protection for military 
personnel. 
<For illustrations of these costs from the US southeast, see 
Apartheid and the US Southeast, Ch. 10) 
2. Military contractors in Arizona include leading firms that 
draw on the state's electrical and electronics manufacturing 
capacity to produce military hardware: 
a. Hughes, Tuscan, is Arizona biggest military contractor, 
with about two fifths of the state's 1986 prime military 
contracts. A part of General Motors (which recently sold 
its South African assets to a South African firm, but 
continues to provide it with technology), Hughes in Arizona 
makes guided missil es 
i. Hughes illustrates how military contracts 
accentuated instability in employment; in 1987, it laid 
off 832 workers from its 7,830 person labor force, which 
was already 1000 workers less than in 1986 <For details, 
see Notes on Issues Relevant ..• attached). 
b. Other leading contractors include Motorola with 
operations in Scottsdale, Tempe, Chandler and Phoenix; 
Garrett with divisions in Phoenix and Tuscan to produce 
turbines, jet engines, and computers for planes and 
nuclear systems; Hughes Helicopter, part of 
McDonnell-Douglas, which manufactures apache Attack 
Helicopter s in Mesa; and Goodyear Aerospace, Litchfield 
Park, which produces airborn radar systems. 
c. Other military contractors which have invested in South 
Africa (besides Hughes) include: Goodyear, GE, 
Honeywell, IBM, ITT, Litton and United Tec hnologies. 
i. See Seidman, Apartheid and the U.S. Southeast, 
Chapter 10, for examples of the potential consequences 
of military contracts in contributing to increased 
capital intensive production, reducing employment; 
redistributing the tax burden; racism; and anti-union 
policies. These possibilities need to be documented in 
Arizona. 
ii. It has been estimated that, from 1981-85, military 
spending cost Arizona a net loss of-8,610 jobs; the same 
money invested in <less capital-intensive) civilian, 
production would have increaed employment CE~ployment 
Research Associates, 474 Hollister Bldg, Lansing, MI 48933). 
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a) Institutionalized discrimination tends to prevent 
Hispanics and women from obtaining the high tech 
jobs associated with military production, 
aggravating the skewed income distribution 
throughout the state: 
b) From 1982-85, militarization of Arizona's 
economy cost a net loss of -9,550 civilian jobs for 
blacks, and -17,300 civilian jobs for women. 
iii. In Arizona, overall tax spending on military 
exceeded gains, so, on average Arizona citizens lost $80 a 
family; in 3 districts, families lost more: #1=-$240; #3=-$2200; 
#4=-$350. Only in 2 districts did they gain~ #2=+$240; #5=+2390. 
B. To cut taxes and pay for the growing military budget <which, 
despite Reagan's pledges to reduce the nation's debt, created a 
federal deficit equal to the entire growth in the nation's 
national product since 1980), the federal government has reduced 
domestic spending for basic human needs, further aggravating the 
negative effects of the changing international division of labor 
implemented by US transnational corporations. 
<See Seidman, Apartheid and the US Southeast for illustrations 
of the resulting cuts in social welfare) 
IV. A PEACEFUL ALTERNATIVE to the present policy of 
militarization and intervention in support of the status quo to 
"open up" thir·d world regions like Africa to US tl~ansnational 
corporate involvement could provide far greater benefits to both 
the peoples of Africa and the United States: 
A. The billions spent in building up US military capacity to 
police the world could be re-directed to providing productive 
employment opportunities, job training, better incomes, and an 
improved social security safety net for US citizens, including 
those living in the Southwest. 
<For dollar for dollar costs of peaceful as opposed to 
military purposes, see Apartheid and the US southeast, Ch. 
11; and Notes on Issues Relevant •.• attached) 
B. An end to support for repressive governments like those 
in South Africa, Zaire and Morocco, coupled with support for the 
full liberation and development of Southern Africa (and, for that 
matter, Africa) could open new opportunities for beneficial trade 
based on expanded purchases of US machinery and equipment to meet 
African development needs in the context of mutually beneficial 
trade. 
<For estimates of the mutual benefits of these kinds of 
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possibilities, see ch. 12 of Apartheid and the US southeast.> 
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